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Abstract 
 
Global Value chains (GVC) provide a new channel of innovation for firms participating in 
value chains or utilizing the value chain strategy to grow. Upgrading to high value added 
segments of GVCs step by step is a linear model of innovation. Our analysis on the Chinese 
firms involved in the value chain of the iPhone shows that the Chinese mobile industry has 
climbed up ladders of the iPhone value chain and performed relatively sophisticated tasks 
beyond simple assembly. In addition, by examining foreign value added and technology 
embedded in the smartphones of OPPO, Xiaomi and Huawei, we argue the Chinese smartphone 
vendors primarily follow a non-linear model of innovation, jumping directly to brand 
development before acquiring sufficient technology capacity. They have been focusing on 
incremental innovations and product differentiation by taking advantage of available 
technology platforms. The value chain strategy enabled them to overcome technology 
deficiency effectively and opened a short-cut to catch-up foreign rivals and evolve into leading 
smartphone makers in both domestic and foreign markets.   
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1. Introduction  
Innovation and new technology are primary driving forces of economic development. Constant 
innovation is indispensable for a developing country who wishes to avoid middle-income trap, 
grow into a high-income country, and eventually become a catch-up industrialized economy.  
After the rapid economic growth of the last four decades, China now has a $13 trillion economy, 
second in size only to the US. Its GPD per capita is now more than $9,000, almost ten times 
that when China started its revolutionary economic reform in 1979. Continuous technology 
innovation contributed substantially to that economic miracle. The Global Innovation Index 
2018, compiled by Cornell University, INSEAD and the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (2018), ranks China as one of the 20 most innovative economies in the world. 
China’s aggregate investment in research and development (R&D) rose steadily as its economy 
grew continuously. In 2017, Chinese R&D was equivalent to 2.13% of its GDP, making China 
the second in the world in R&D investment (Atkinson and Foote, 2019). Several studies (e.g, 
Wu, 2010; Lida, Shoji and Yoneyama, 2018) conclude that China’s R&D investment 
contributed substantially to the growth of the total factor productivity of its economy.  
 
To date, China is not only the largest exporter of labor intensive goods, such as shoes, clothes 
and toys, but also the largest exporter of personal computers, mobile phones, digital cameras 
and other information communication technology (ICT) products. The Chinese manufacturing 
output exceeded that of the US and became the world No. 1 (West and Lansang, 2018). In the 
world market for white goods, China’s Haier Group has emerged as a leading maker of 
electronic appliances, to the point where Haier is now recognized as a global brand. In the 
global market for personal computers (PCs), the Chinese company Lenovo has surpassed H-P 
and Dell to rank No.1 with a 24% of the global market (IDC, 2018). In the global mobile phone 
market, home-grown Chinese brands Huawei, OPPO and Xiaomi are now three of the top five 
global smartphone brands (Counterpoint, 2019b). Those achievements are largely the result of 
Chinese firms’ constant endeavors to innovate.     
 
There are many channels in which Chinese firms can innovate, and thus strengthen their 
competitiveness in global markets and narrow technological gaps with foreign multinational 
enterprises (MNE) currently leading in both technology and brand. R&D investment, foreign 
direct investment, innovation institutions, fiscal subsidies, learning by doing, and reverse 
engineering are all effective tools for innovation and product enhancement. In this paper, I 
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focus on the role of global value chains (GVC) in facilitating both product and process 
innovation of Chinese firms.  
 
With the unprecedented trade liberalization and the modularization of the processes for 
production of manufactured products, in particular ICT, MNEs have reorganized their 
production along GVCs, where specific activities and production tasks are standardized and 
allocated to firms in dispersed geographic locations as a result of outsourcing or offshoring. 
Participating in GVCs led by MNEs having advanced technology, internationally recognized 
brands, and global distribution networks, offers Chinese firms opportunities to learn and to 
access new knowledge and advanced technology, thus enhancing their innovation capacity. 
The expansion of GVCs has been driven by production fragmentation and the modularization 
of production tasks, the two factors that have lowered technical barriers to entry into 
technology-intensive sectors such as high-tech industry. Taking advantage of the availability 
of standardized technology platforms, Chinese firms have concentrated on incremental rather 
than drastic innovations and aimed at the introduction of differentiated products and at 
competition with lead foreign companies in both domestic and foreign markets. 
 
To a certain extent, Chinese firms in ICT industry achieved their success by adopting the value 
chain strategy. Most China’s high-tech exports are manufactured with imported core 
technology components and built on the top of technology platforms provided by foreign 
MNEs (Xing, 2014). Assembling mobile phones for foreign vendors remains a major task for 
many Chinese firms. In this paper, I will use the case of the Chinese mobile phone industry to 
illustrate the importance of GVCs in the facilitation of innovations, and demonstrate how 
Chinese firms have enhanced their innovation capacity by participating in GVCs.  
 
2. GVCs, Innovation, and Upgrading  
GVCs represent a new form of business operation, spanning multiple countries to create goods 
and deliver them to end consumers in world markets. Production fragmentation and 
modularization enable production processes for the dissemination of ready-to-use goods, 
particularly ICT products, to geographically dispersed locations. Unprecedented liberalization 
of trade and investment, innovation in ocean transportation, and profit seeking behavior of 
MNEs have been the main drivers of the emergence of GVCs in recent decades (OECD, 2013). 
Today, most manufacturing commodities are actually produced and traded along value chains. 
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A typical GVC orchestrates a series of tasks necessary for delivery of a product. Ranging from 
conception to delivery to end consumers, these tasks include research and development, 
product design, manufacture of parts and components, and assembly and distribution (Gereffi 
and Karina, 2011). Firms in different countries work in coordination to complete those tasks. 
Each firm specializes in one or more tasks in which it has comparative advantage, and 
contributes part of the whole value added of the final product.  GVCs characterizes a new 
division of labor—vertical specialization along same product. This specialization is different 
from the specialization where firms make different products, as analyzed by the British 
economist David Ricardo two centuries ago. Compared to conventional specialization in 
different products, specialization in tasks along value chains further refines the division of labor 
among nations and enhances the efficiency of resource allocation, consequently raising the 
productivity and economic growth of all economies involved. Three terms, GVC, supply chain 
and production network, refer interchangeably to the same phenomenon. Economists generally 
prefer the term GVC, because they are interested in the creation of value added and its 
distribution along value chains. Use of the terms supply chain and production network typically 
focuses on the production stages within value chains, the former emphasizing who produces 
what, and the relations between upstream and downstream firms; the latter paying attention to 
geographic locations of firms.    
 
A lead firm, which manages the operation of a value chain and decides the relations between 
firms participating in the chain, is necessary for any meaningful GVCs.  If we break down the 
tasks contributing to the production of a product, from supply of the raw materials used, to 
manufacture of the product and on to the eventual delivery of the product to targeted consumers, 
we can easily sketch a chain that superficially links all of the firms involved in the process. If 
the links along a value chain are not bonded with binding contracts, i.e. if the relations are 
simply defined by free market transactions as buyer-seller relations, those value chains add 
little in terms of innovation.  According to their governance structure, GVCs can be classified 
into producer-driven and buyer-driven value chains. GVCs led by technology leaders in 
capital-intensive industries such as automobile, aircraft, computer and semiconductor, are 
producer-driven value chains. On the other hand, buyer-driven chains are typically organized 
by large retailers, branded marketers and branded manufacturers (Gereffi, 1999). The 
automobile value chains organized by Japanese auto-maker Toyota and the iPhone value chain 
of Apple are producer-driven GVCs. Similarly, Walmart, taking advantage of its extensive 
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retail networks in the US and other countries, has built its buyer-driven GVC by sourcing all 
goods from contract manufacturers, 60,000 of which are located in China.  
 
Economists define innovation as the activities in which a firm applies new notions to the 
products, processes and other elements that generate increased value added. Innovation 
generally includes two dimensions: product innovation, the introduction of a new product; and 
process innovation—introduction of a new process for the manufacture or delivery of goods 
and services (Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2010). Richard Nelson (1995), a leading expert on 
innovation, defines innovation as “the processes by which firms master product designs and 
production processes that are new to them, if not to the world, nation or sector.” Nelson’s 
definition emphasizes the firm’s learning of something new. It is critical to bear in mind that 
innovation is not a narrowly defined term referring to the creation of a drastically new product 
that surprises the world. To be sure, a completely new product such as the iPhone with its 
multi-touch screen and virtual keyboard is definitely a revolutionary innovation for the world.  
However, learning how to make smartphones with multi-touch screens is also an innovation 
for a firm imitating the iPhone. Most innovations are actually incremental achievements based 
on existing knowledge.  
 
Innovations are not limited to new products, production processes, or technology. New 
business models and marketing channels, aiming to enhance efficiency and value added, also 
constitute innovation. “The introduction or implementation of a new or significantly improved 
product, service or process, a new marketing method or a new way of organizing business, 
work organization or external relations” (OECD, 1997). For instance, using iTunes to sell songs 
one by one, not combined in an album (which bundles popular and less-popular songs together) 
is a drastic innovation that has fundamentally changed the business model of the music industry. 
With the iTunes, it’s now possible for an artist to achieve fame and financial success with just 
one hit song (Isaacson, 2011).   
 
Along GVCs, there are many tasks with varying degrees of technical sophistication. The value 
added created by those tasks also varies substantially. In general, product design, R&D, 
branding and retailing constitute relatively high value added, while assembly and production 
of standardized components contribute relatively low value added. The relative importance of 
tasks in terms of value added can be illustrated intuitively with a smile curve (Figure 1). 
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              Figure 1. Upgrading along GVCs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Source: created by the author based on the smile curve by Stan Shih. 
 
Firms from developing countries general start with low value added tasks such as assembly 
when they join value chains governed by foreign MNEs. Many Chinese firms started with 
assembly of mobile phones for foreign MNEs. Innovation is imperative for firms participating 
in GVCs if they wish to move up the ladder in value chains and capture high value added. 
Otherwise, they may fall into a low value-added trap (Sturgeon and Kawakami, 2010)).  
Upgrading includes product upgrading (adding additional value to products); functional 
upgrading, such as from pure assembly to design work: and process upgrading (making a 
production process more efficient) (Morrison, Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2008 ).  Upgrading 
along GVCs and entering high value added segments is a result of innovation activities.  
 
3. GVCs: a New Path for Innovation by the Chinese Mobile Phone Industry 
In any value chain, the lead firm defines products, sets up quality standards, and specifies 
technical parameters. All non-lead firms are obliged to follow the design rules specified by the 
lead firm. Intensive communication and information exchange between the lead firm and the 
suppliers is common, and offers a unique channel for non-lead firms to access new knowledge 
and production know-how. Learning mechanisms within GVCs include face-to-face 
interactions, knowledge transfer from lead firms, pressure to adopt international standards, and 
training of local workforce by lead firms (Marchi, Giuliani and Rabellotti, 2017). Gereffi (1999) 
argued that participation in GVCs is a necessary step for industrial upgrading. Plugging into a 
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GVC is similar to engaging in a dynamic learning curve. The transformation of some Asian 
suppliers from original equipment manufacturers (OEM) to original design manufacturers 
(ODM) in apparel industry was significantly supported by their participation in apparel 
commodity chains.  
 
China has for some time been recognized for its role as the assembly center of major global 
brands. Before the emergence of smartphones, Motorola and Nokia used China as a major 
assembly base. Since the launch of the first generation iPhone, China has been the exclusive 
assembler of iPhones. At the peak, Samsung, the No. 1 mobile phone maker in the world, had 
65% of its mobile phones assembled in China. The Chinese companies who assemble phones 
for and supply components to those global mobile phone vendors are part of their value chains.  
The inter-firm linkages between the Chinese firms and upstream foreign buyers open the 
Chinese firms’ access to information about technology and consumer demand, and thus 
facilitate their innovation activities and upgrading progress along value chains.  
 
Upgrading along value chains step by step from low value added to high value added tasks 
constitutes a linear model of innovation. For instance, a firm starts from assembling mobile 
phones, then enters the manufacturing of components, and eventually to product mobile phones 
with its own brand. This is a linear path of innovation. Whereas sourcing core technology from 
foreign suppliers and jumping directly to brand building leads to a non-linear model of 
innovation. Chinese original brand manufacturers (OBM), such as Xiaomi, OPPO and vivo, 
adopted the non-linear model by taking advantage of the modularization of mobile phone 
production and successfully broke the monopoly of foreign rivals in both domestic and 
international markets. 
 
To a large extent, the expansion of GVCs in ICT is attributed to the development of modularity, 
the division of the manufacture of complicated products into modules—sub-systems that can 
be designed and manufactured independently. Modularity allows firms to mix and match 
components so as to produce final products catering to various consumer preferences.  By 
exploring modularity in the design of products, firms can improve their product innovation rate 
(Baldwin and Clark, 2018).   
 
Firms in developing countries typically face two challenges: a technology gap and a market 
gap. “Technology gap,” referring to the difficulty of accessing necessary technologies, is 
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associated with weak innovation capacity (Schmitz, 2007). Modularity creates the possibility 
of outsourcing essential technologies and enables firms in developing countries to specialize 
in value chain tasks for which they have comparative advantage. For example, a mobile phone 
consists of more than one thousand parts and components. The modularization of mobile phone 
production has simplified the complexity of production and allowed potential entries to focus 
on non-core technology activities such as assembly. Given their relatively limited technology 
capacity in core components, say, processors and memory chips, Chinese mobile phone makers 
entered the industry by sourcing core technological components from foreign MNEs and 
focusing on incremental innovations, marketing and building brand.   
 
At the early stage of mobile phone development, the production of mobile phones was 
complicated and vertically integrated within a single firm. In that setting, a few large firms in 
industrialized countries (e.g., Nokia, Ericson and Texas Instruments) monopolized global 
markets. In 2001 Wavecom, the French firm that first introduced the GSM model, developed 
the first module allowing handset makers to easily integrate applications into one main board. 
Taking advantage of this modularization, China’s TCL, an electronic appliance maker, entered 
the mobile phone market (Sun, Chen, Pleggenkuhle-Miles, 2010).  
 
The “turnkey” solution introduced by Mediatek (MTK), a fabless Taiwanese semiconductor 
firm, is a milestone in the development of the Chinese mobile phone industry. It greatly 
enhances the degree of the modularity of mobile phone production, especially for small phone 
makers who lack required technology capacities. The turnkey solution, an integrated solution 
combining hardware and software, is a single chip that combines a baseband platform and 
multimedia (sound and image) data processing. Using the chip, firms can easily modify product 
functionality to appeal to preferences of diversified consumers, thus lowering entry barriers 
significantly (Imai and Shiu, 2010).  MTK’s turnkey solution boosted the proliferation of  
“Shanzhai” mobile phone makers, which had previously served as either OEMs or distributors 
for leading mobile phone brands. (“Shanzhai” originally meant counterfeit or imitation 
products.) However, a few studies argue that Shanzai phones signify indigenous innovation 
products by small phone makers, and constitute good enough products with affordable prices 
to meet the needs of targeted customers. Shanzai phone makers gained market share not 
through technology innovation, but by adopting a novel business model (Hu, Wan and Zhu, 
201) 
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In the age of smartphones, Android operating system (OS) and Qualcomm processor chipsets 
have become standard technology platforms. Leading Chinese smart phone makers ZTE, 
Xiaomi, OPPO and Vivo all have adopted Android OS for their smartphones. Xiaomi and 
OPPO built 70% of their phones on Qualcomm’s platforms; ZTE and vivo used Qualcomm’s 
platforms for 60% and 50% of their phones respectively (World Bank, 2019). Android OS 
platform has lowered technology barriers for brand vendors, who are capable of high-end 
product development, and handset assemblers until now only capable of manufacturing white-
box phones; this has facilitated the transformation of a few firms, OEMs, into original brand 
manufactures, OPPO is a noticeable example (Chen and Wen, 2013). The complexity of 
today’s technology platforms and the demand for product differentiation have enhanced 
communication and cooperation between foreign suppliers of technology platforms and the 
downstream Chinese firms using those platforms, thus facilitating innovation by Chinese 
mobile phone makers. For instance, as the major platform supplier to leading Chinese mobile 
phone makers, Qualcomm welcomes the research teams of those Chinese firms to its 
headquarters for product development. After intensive interactions with Qualcomm and power 
chip provider Texas Instruments, OPPO introduced the world’s first VOOC (Voltage Open 
Loop Multi-step Constant-Cur Charging) system for smartphones (Humphrey, et.al., 2018).   
 
In addition, the huge Chinese market, with a population of 1.4 billion, is conducive to 
marketing-focused strategies based on borrowed technology. In China a focus on the domestic 
market lessens the marketing gap and leads Chinese mobile phone makers towards a focus on 
marketing and product differentiation. Compared with leading foreign mobile phone makers, 
Chinese mobile phone makers have relatively more information and a better understanding of 
Chinese consumers. At the early stage of their development, Chinese mobile phone makers 
primarily adopted a low price strategy to attract consumers who could not afford expensive 
foreign brands, and targeted consumers in the country’s third and fourth tier cities, to which 
foreign brand vendors had paid less attention. In addition, the Chinese makers explored niche 
markets, introducing a variety of peripheral functions, such as dual SIM cards, selfie 
specialization, and long life batteries.  
 
Brandt and Thun (2010) expected that, by adopting value chain strategy, Chinese handset 
makers “will be more akin to a Dell (which does little product research and design) than Tom 
Watson’s IBM (which was highly vertically-integrated).”  However, Xiaomi’s MIU interface, 
OPPO’s VOOC flashing charging technology and Huawei’s Kirin processor are clearly evident 
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that they are technologically innovative. More importantly, by focusing on marketing and 
brand building, Chinese mobile phone makers have nurtured their brands, which are now 
recognized by not only Chinese users but also foreign consumers. For instance, in India Xiaomi 
has surpassed both Apple and Samsung and emerged as the most popular brand. Brand 
leadership can boost sales growth, profit margin expansion and pricing power, and affords 
Chinese mobile phone makers the power to lead the value chains of their products and capture 
relatively large shares of value added. The bottom line is that brand development is an effective 
strategy for product innovation (Credit Suisse, 2010) 
 
4. The Rise of the Chinese Mobile Phone Industry 
The rise of the Chinese mobile phone industry is a GVC success story. Despite its technological 
dependence on foreign technology platforms, the Chinese mobile phone industry has emerged 
as the largest mobile phone producer and exporter in the world. Figure 2 outlines the trend of 
Chinse mobile output and exports from 2000 to 2016. In 2016, China produced 2.0 billion 
mobile phones, of which 1.3 billion were destined for foreign markets. At the beginning of the 
21st century, the scale of China’s mobile phone output and export was relatively small. In 2000, 
China produced 52.5 million mobile handsets, of which 22.8 million, or about 43% of the total, 
were exported to overseas markets. Driven by the drastic growth of global demand and rapid 
technology innovation in the sector, the annual output of mobile phones surged to 998.3 million 
in 2010. Exports grew even faster, jumping to 776 million that year, making China the No.1 
exporter in the world.  
Figure 2.  Chinese Output and Export of Mobile Phones 
 
 
Sources: UNCOMTRDE and China Statistics Bureau 
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It is important to emphasize that, between 2005 and 2015, China’s mobile phone exports 
constantly accounted for more than three quarters of its annual output. At the peak, in the year 
of 2012, China shipped 1.03 billion mobile phone abroad, more than 87% of the year’s output. 
Most of the exported phones were sold under foreign brands and Chinese brand mobile phones 
almost did not exist in international markets. This unambiguously demonstrates that the 
Chinese mobile phone industry was then functioning as the assembly center of global mobile 
phone production. Participation in value chains governed by leading global vendors and 
performing assembly tasks were the main drivers of that growth. As a segment of numerous 
value chains, the Chinese mobile industry simultaneously benefited from the spillover effects 
of innovation and marketing activities of the leading global vendors, such as Apple and 
Samsung, that were steadily driving the global demand for mobile phones upward.   
Figure 3.  Chinese Smartphone Market Share (%) 
 
Source： Counterpoint (2019a) and Chen and Wen (2013) 
 
Surging output volume represents the quantitative dimension of China’s success in building its 
mobile phone production capacity. Another important dimension of that success is the brand 
development by indigenous Chinese firms. In addition to manufacturing handsets for foreign 
OBMs, the Chinese mobile phone industry successfully nurtured a few mobile phone brands 
which are competitive with foreign branded mobile phones in both China and abroad. Huawei, 
OPPO, vivo and Xiaomi, the most famous Chinese mobile phone brands, have successfully 
eroded the market share of their foreign rivals and reversed foreign domination of the sector 
completely in the Chinese market. Marketing research by Counterpoint (2019a) shows that in 
Q1 of 2019 Chinese brands captured 90% of the Chinese smartphone market, led by Huawei 
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with 34%. The top four smartphone brands in terms of shipments (Huawei, vivo, OPPO and 
Xiaomi), all Chinese brands, together accounted for 87% of the market, with Apple retaining 
a mere 9% of the market. The share of Samsung, the No.1 mobile phone maker in the world, 
shrank to 1% (Figure 3). Back in 2012, Samsung was the largest vendor in the Chinese market, 
with 14% market share, while Huawei had only 10%. The market shares of OPPO, vivo and 
Xiaomi were negligible.   
 
Building on their success in the home market, Chinese OBMs started to sell mobile phones 
with home-grown brands in international markets, gaining more and more market share, and 
eventually emerging as globally recognized brands. In Q1 of 2019, Huawei’s global market 
share was 17%, surpassing that of Apple and ranking the second, just 4 percentage points lower 
than that of Samsung.  In fact, OPPO and vivo belong to the same company, BBK Electronics 
Corporation, a Chinese multinational firm specializing in electronics.  The combined market 
share of those two brands was 15%, also exceeding that of Apple. In other words, BBK 
Electronics Corporation is actually the third largest mobile phone maker in the world. In 2012, 
Huawei’s market share was about one fourth of Samsung’s. OPPO, vivo and Xiaomi were 
unknown to foreign consumers. It is noteworthy that three bankrupted mobile phone makers, 
BlackBerry, Nokia and HTC, together accounted for 18.4% of global shipments in 2012. At 
that time Chinese PC maker Lenova acquired the Motorola brand. The market share of 
Motorola became part of Chinese mobile phone maker share, so together those Chinese firms 
accounted for 44% of smartphone shipments in the global market (Figure 4) 
Figure 4.  Global Smartphone Market Share (%) 
 
Source: Counterpoint (2019b) and Chen and Wen (2013) 
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5. Moving Up in the iPhone Value Chain  
 
The operation of Apple is an exemplary GVC. Apple has outsourced the production of its 
products to contract manufacturers in various geographic locations and has concentrated 
mainly on product design, R&D and the development of software for its operating systems at 
one tail of the smile curve and marketing and retail at the other. All Apple products, iMac, 
MacBook Air, iPad, and iPhone, are assembled in China. The phrase, “Designed by Apple 
in California Assembled in China,” printed on the back of all Apple products, is a hallmark of 
Apple products.  
 
So far, Apple has released twelve generations of iPhones. With the introduction of the iPhone 
X, which carries not only most advanced technologies such as 3D sensing technology, but with 
a $1,000 price tag, the iPhone has been transformed into a luxury high-tech gadget. China has 
been the exclusive assembly base for the iPhone since the first generation iPhone, iPhone 3G, 
was released in 2007. As the center of the iPhone production, the Chinese mobile phone 
industry benefits significantly from the popularity of the iPhone in the world market. The 
constantly rising demand for the iPhone in the world market always automatically translates 
into demand for the services and periphery components supplied by the Chinese mobile phone 
industry. This has significantly promoted the growth of the Chinese sector in the last decades.  
 
According to Xing and Detert (2010), Foxconn, a Taiwanese company with many production 
facilities in mainland China, received only $6.5 for assembling a ready-to-use iPhone 3G. That 
$6.5 accounts for 3.6% of the total iPhone 3G manufacturing cost and roughly 1.3% of the 
retail price. It consists of the whole value added captured by China in the process of 
manufacturing the iPhone 3G. To avoid low-value added trap and take advantage of the 
learning opportunity offered by GVCs, upgrading and moving into relatively high value added 
segments are crucial for Chinese firms involved in the iPhone value chain. To assess the 
upgrading status of Chinese firms participating in the value chain, it is necessary to examine 
whether the number of Chinese firms involved in Apple’s value chains has increased, whether 
the range of tasks performed by Chinese firms has expanded, and whether the technological 
sophistication of the tasks has risen.  
 
Upgrading along the iPhone value chain is highly rewarding financially. In general, future 
uncertainty discourages firms from engaging in innovation efforts. Once a Chinese firm joins 
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the army of Apple supplier companies, hundreds of millions of Apple users around the world 
will be potential customers for that firm’s products or services. The predictable and lucrative 
prospect motivates Chinese firms to raise the quality of their products up to the standard of 
Apple. This is a example of innovation activities inspired by GVC participation. Seamus and 
Yutao (2016) found that Chinese firms have played an increasingly important role in Apple’s 
value chains. In 2014, of 198 companies in Apple’s supply chain, 14 were Chinese. A few of 
them supplied core components, e.g., displays and printed circuit boards; this suggests that 
Chinese firms have strengthened their presence in the value chains controlled by Apple.  
 
We examine the teardown data of the iPhone X to assess the involvement of Chinese firms in 
the production of the iPhone X.  The teardown data, which provides detailed information about 
suppliers of the iPhoneX as well as prices of parts and components, shows that all core 
components embedded in the printed circuit board assembly (PCBA), including processor, 
DRAM, NAND, display and camera, are supplied by Apple, Qualcomm, Broadcom, Samsung, 
Toshiba, Sony and other non-Chinese companies. Indigenous Chinese companies 
manufactured only a small portion of non-core components. It should be noted that besides the 
assembler Foxconn, there are 10 local Chinese companies participating in the value chain of 
the iPhone X. Their tasks go beyond simple assembly task and spread over relatively 
sophisticated segments. Table 1 lists Chinese firms and their corresponding tasks in the 
production of the iPhone X.   
Table 1 Tasks Performed by Chinese Firms for the iPhone 3G and iPhone X 
3G iPhone (2009) iPhone X (2018) 
• Assembly 
(Foxconn) 
• Assembly ( Foxconn); 
• Function parts for Touchscreen Module (Anjie 
Technology); 
• Filter for 3D sensing Module (Crystal Optech); 
• Coil Module for wireless charging (Lushare 
Precision); 
• Printed Circuit Board (M-Flex); 
• Speakers (Goertek); 
• RF Antenna (Shenzhen Sunway); 
• Battery Pack (Sunwada); 
• Glass cover (Lens Technology); 
• Stainless Frame (Kersen Technology); 
• Camera Module (O-Filem)  
 
Source: Xing and Detert (2010) and the teardown data provided by the author’s technical 
supporting team. 
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Sunwada, a leading Chinese battery maker, supplies the battery pack. Sony batteries were used 
in the early models of the iPhone; Sunwada’s supplanting Sony as a battery pack supplier is a 
significant upgrading of Sunwada along the iPhone value chain.  Kersen Technology provides 
the iPhone stainless frames, and Lens Technology manufactures the glass covers. The stainless 
frame and glass back cover together cost $53, about 13% of the total manufacturing cost and 
more than 11 times the assembly fee of $4.5. The iPhone X is the first iPhone with a glass back 
cover.  In addition, Chinese companies Anjie Technology and Lushare Precision are involved 
in manufacturing iPhone X touch screens and 3D sensing modules, respectively. Touch screens 
and 3D sensing modules are critical technological components of the iPhone X. The former 
translate users’ finger movements into data that can be interpreted as commands, while the 
latter is a key element of the facial recognition system, a new feature introduced in the iPhone 
X.  Chinese company Dongshan Precision joined the suppliers of Apple by acquiring American 
company M-Flex; it now supplies the printed circuit boards for the iPhone X for $15 per unit. 
Chinese companies Goertech, Shenzhen Sunway, Crystal-Opetch and O-film provide 
functional parts: speakers, RF antennas, filters and camera modules, respectively. The 
involvement of those Chinese firms, even though in non-core technology segments of the 
Phone X value chain, indicates that the Chinese mobile phone industry as a whole has moved 
to upper rungs of the iPhone value chain ladder.  
Figure 5: Chinese Value Added Embedded in the iPhone 3G and iPhone X 
 
Source: Xing and Detert (2010) and the author’s calculation 
 
According to the teardown data, the total bill of materials of the iPhone X is $409.25, of which 
the Chinese firms jointly contribute $104, about 25.4% of the total manufacturing cost. A 
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complete value chain consists of pre-production, production and post-production activities. For 
estimation of the domestic value added in a country’s exports, and to fairly evaluate bilateral 
trade balances with its trading partners, it is appropriate to use the manufacturing cost of a 
product as a benchmark. For assessment of the value captured by Chinese firms in the whole 
iPhone X value chain, we should go beyond production and use retail price as a benchmark, 
since retail price proxies total value added of the iPhone X. We found that the Chinese firms 
together captured 10.4% of the value added in the iPhone X’s retail price $1000, much higher 
than that for iPhone 3G (Figure 5) 
 
Therefore, compared with the iPhone 3G, more Chinese firms are involved in the production 
of the iPhone X and they perform more diversed tasks and capture higher value added. This 
implies significant upward movement by Chinese firms along the iPhone value chain. All of 
Apple’s suppliers are required to satisfy the high quality and technology standards defined by 
Apple.  The pressure to meet the standards of Apple facilitated the upgrading process of those 
firms and their innovation activities. 
 
 
6. OPPO and Xiaomi: a GVC Success Story  
 
OPPO is one of the most popular mobile phone brands in the Chinese market. In the first quarter 
of 2019, it ranked No. 3 after Huawei and vivo, with 18% market share (Counterpoint, 2019a). 
“Designed by OPPO Assembled in China” is printed on the back of OPPO phones.  The 
statement is actually an imitation of the similar phrase on the back of the iPhone, but sounds a 
little bit strange, as OPPO is clearly a 100% Chinese company. OPPO intends to use the 
statement to convey a message to its users: OPPO phones are made of the state-of-the-art 
technologies and China’s role is limited to assembly. The statement is self-evident in that 
OPPO phones are products of GVCs. By providing an excellent selfie experience, OPPO 
smartphones have achieved widespread popularity among young people. OPPO actually 
markets its phones as camera phones in commercials, to differentiate OPPO from other brands.  
The company operates a nationwide network of 200,000 stores to sell its products in China. It 
generally pays a much more generous commission than the industrial average to motivate its 
salespersons (Wang, 2016). Globally, OPPO shipped 25.7 million units of smartphones in the 
first quarter of 2019 and held fifth position among leading mobile phone vendors (Counterpoint, 
2019b) 
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To understand the dependence of OPPO on foreign technology platforms, we use the teardown 
data of the OPPO R11s, a premium smartphone released in 2017, running on Andriod OS, to 
examine the suppliers of OPPO in details. The teardown data shows that all core components 
were sourced from foreign suppliers. The phone is powered by Qualcomm’s mid-range 
Snapdragon 660 processor, coupled with an embedded multi-chip package (eMCP) by 
Samsung.  It features a 6.1-inch full screen AMOLED display by Samsung. All components 
embedded in the PCBA are supplied by foreign companies, particularly Qualcomm, Samsung, 
TDK and Muruta. SONY supplies the rear camera, Samsung the front camera for selfies. The 
total value added of foreign companies accounts for 83.3% of the total manufacturing costs, 
consistent with the statement “assembled in China” (table 2). A few Chinese firms provide a 
limited number of non-core components such as the fingerprint module (by O-film) and the 
battery (by Sunwada).  
 
Table 2. Foreign Technology and Suppliers of the OPPO R11s 
 
Operation System Andriod (US) Total Foreign Value Added 
CPU : Snapdragon 660 Qualcomm (US)   
 
83.3% of total manufacturing 
cost $293.18 
Memory: eMCP Samsung (Korea) 
Display : 
6.01inch 1080x2160 pixels 
Samsung (Korea) 
Dual Camera  Sony (Japan) 
Front Camera Samsung (Korea) 
Source: Xing and He (2018). 
 
Figure 6. Distribution of the OPPO R11s Value Added by Country 
 
Source: Xing and He (2018) 
16.7
40.3
18.4 18.5
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Figure 5 shows the estimated distribution of value added of the OPPO R11s by country. The 
total bill of materials of the phone is $293.18. Korean companies Samsung and Hynix together 
contributed 40.3% of the total manufacturing cost. The second largest source of value added is 
18.5%, from the US. The contribution of the Japanese companies Sony, Muruta and others is 
estimated at 18.4%, almost same as that of the US. The Chinese companies accounted for the 
smallest share of value added.  However, if we take the retail price 2999 RMB as a benchmark, 
the cross-country distribution of value added is dramatically different: China emerges with the 
largest share of total value added, about 45.3% of the retail price, which shows the power of 
brand ownership: that significantly high share is attributed to brand value and the 
corresponding retail service (figure 5). 
 
Xiaomi is the 4th largest mobile phone maker in the world.  It shipped 27.8 million smartphones 
globally in 2019 (Counterpoint, 2019b).  Different from OPPO, Xiaomi is a factory-less maker 
and has no assembly facilities. It outsources the production of its phones to contract 
manufacturers. Xiaomi is the first Chinese mobile phone vendor to sell phones exclusively 
online. The secrets of Xiaomi’s success include: selling a premium phone at about a half the 
price of its competitors; fast-flashing sales; and nurturing a community of users. Xiaomi’s 
largest foreign market is India, where it surpassed Samsung to become the No.1 smartphone 
vendor.  
Table 3. Foreign Technology and Suppliers of the Xiaomi MIX 2 
Operating System Android (US) Foreign Value Added 
CPU: Snapdragon 835 Qualcomm (US)  
84.6% of the total 
manufacturing cost $335.98. 
NAND 6GB Hynix (Korea) 
DRAM 64GB Samsung (Korea) 
Display: 5.99 inch, 1080x2160 JDI (Japan) 
Camera SONY (Japan) 
Source: Xing and He (2018) 
 
Similar to OPPO smartphones, all Xiaomi phones run on Android OS and are designed based 
on Qualcomm chipsets. Xiaomi, however, has developed a unique MIUI interface based on 
Android OS and installed it on Xiaomi phones to differentiate with other brands. We employ 
the case of the flagship device MIX 2 released in the second half of 2017 to demonstrate 
Xiaomi’s reliance on foreign technology. The teardown data of the MIX2 reveal that it is 
powered by a top-end Qualcomm Snapdragon 835 processor, which costs $62.56, the most 
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expensive part in the PCBA of the MIX2. It has a 6GB NAND flash memory, supplied by the 
Korean company Hynix, and 64GB Dynamic random access memory manufactured by 
Samsung. With regard to functional parts, the Xiaomi MIX 2 features a 5.99 inch 1080x2160 
pixel display produced by Japan Device Inc. Sony supplies the camera embedded in the phone. 
Chinese companies are mainly involved in provision of non-core components and services. For 
instance, BIYADI Electronics supplies the frame of the phone and the battery company SCUD 
provides the battery.  Table 3 lists major foreign technology suppliers.  
 
Foreign companies together accounted for 84.6% of the value added of manufacturing the 
Xiaomi MIX 2. Specifically, the US companies captured 38.6% of the value added, the highest 
among all country groups, followed by Japanese companies with 20.3% and Korean 20.0%. 
Similar to the case of the OPPO R11s, the Chinese companies’ contribution to the value added 
of the MIX 2 is relatively small, about 15.4% of total production cost, suggesting that the 
involvement of Chinese companies in the value chain of Xiaomi is limited.  The retail price of 
the MIX is 3299 RMB. If we include the value added generated by Xiaomi’s brand and the 
retail service, the share of the Chinese value added is 41.7%, significantly higher than that 
when only production is considered. Again, the brand ownership raise the Chinese value added. 
Figure 7. Distribution of the Xiaomi MIX 2’s Value Added 
 
Source: Xing and He (2018) 
 
The teardown data of the OPPO R11s and the Xiaomi MIX 2 suggest that foreign technology 
remains indispensable for Chinese brand mobile phones.  Even though OPPO and Xiaomi have 
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emerged as a global brand, the innovations of the two companies are incremental and marginal. 
Instead of targeting drastic technology advancement for catching up, they emphasize product 
differentiation, brand building and business model by taking advantage of the availability of 
the technology platforms. The successes of OPPO and Xiaomi indicates that GVCs provides a 
non-linear model of innovation and firms of developing countries can enter high-tech industry 
and emerge as lead firms by sourcing necessary technologies.  
 
The innovation path of Huawei differs with that of Xiaomi and OPPO. It is the largest mobile 
phone maker in China and the second largest in the world.  Huawei is considered the most 
innovative Chinese company. In 2018, it invested $15.3 billion in R&D and even outspent 
Apple (Bloomberg, 2019).  Compared to OPPO and Xiaomi, the innovations of Huawei are 
relatively more technology-oriented. It has developed the Kirin Processor, which is used in the 
latest model Huawei Pro 30.  According to the teardown data of the Japanese firm Fomalhaut 
Techno Solution, Huawei Pro30 is powered by the Kirin processor of HiSilicon, a subsidiary 
of Huawei, suggesting that Huawei has developed the technological capacity to produce a chip 
set which can substitute for Qualcomm’s chipsets, currently adopted by most Chinese mobile 
phone makers. The Kirin processor marks the highest level of technological innovation by the 
Chinese mobile phone industry. In addition, the Huawei Pro 30 incorporates an OLED display 
manufactured by Chinese company BOE Technology. The OLED display is the most 
expensive part embedded in the Huawei Pro30.  Because of the above two key components, 
the Chinese value added in the Huawei Pro 30 reached 38.1%, much higher than that in the 
OPPO R11s and the Xiaomi MIX 2.  Samsung, LG and JDI have been dominant in OLED 
display market. The adoption of BOE Technology’s OLED display by Huawei is a noticeable 
encroachment of the monopoly of the foreign companies. 
Table 4. Foreign Technology and Suppliers of Huawei Pro 30 
Operating System Android (US) Foreign Value Added 
CPU HiSilicon (China)  
61.9% of total manufacturing 
cost. 
NAND Samsung (Korea) 
DRAM  Micron Technology (US) 
Display BOE Technology (China) 
Source: Fomalhaut Techno Solution.  
7. Concluding Remarks 
The rise of the Chinese mobile industry is impressive and unique. On the one hand, China has 
become the largest mobile phone maker and the largest exporter in the world. Of the top five 
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global mobile phone brands, three are Chinese brands: Huawei, Xiaomi and OPPO. On the 
other hand, all Chinese smartphones depend on foreign technology platforms. They run on 
the Android OS owned by Google and are powered by Qualcomm chipsets. However, that 
technology deficiency has not hindered the emergence of the Chinese mobile phone industry. 
The value chain strategy of sourcing necessary technology platforms and concentrating on 
product differentiation and incremental innovation explain the significant achievement of the 
Chinese mobile phone industry. GVCs facilitated by modularization provide a unique path 
for Chinese firms to enter the industry and jump over technological barriers. As latecomers, 
Chinese firms had to begin as contract manufacturers, assembling mobile phones for foreign 
vendors. The emergence of home-grown brands in global markets and their upgrading along 
the value chain of the iPhone suggest that Chinese firms are capable of moving to upper 
phases of value chain work, and that their innovative activities performed a critical role in 
successfully competition with foreign rivals.  
 
The development of GVCs makes it possible to achieve a non-linear model of innovation, 
although the GVC strategy is not risk-free. All the cases presented here refer to technology 
platforms owned by foreign companies, mainly the American companies Google and 
Qualcomm. The efficiency and effectiveness of the GVC strategy is based on the assumption 
that Chinese firms are able to purchase necessary technologies via fair market transactions. If 
unexpected shocks lead to the disruption of the supply chain, e.g., the US blacklist of Huawei, 
the operation of the Chinese firms would suffer devastating disruption.   
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